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FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND THE ANALYST SCANDALS 
Jill E. Fisch* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
I am delighted to be here and to deliver a lecture as part of the series 
honoring Daniel Meador. I am also honored to be part of the group of dis-
tinguished scholars who have delivered lectures in this series. I was invited 
to speak about fiduciaries and, in particular, whether research analysts 
should be regulated as fiduciaries. Regulators, legislators, and the self regu-
latory organizations—the New York Stock Exchange and the NASD—have 
been paying a lot of attention to analyst regulation. What put research ana-
lysts in the spotlight, however?  
By way of background, analyst regulation goes back a few years to the 
stock market boom of the 1990s. Like most such booms, it eventually 
ended. In fact, it ended with the dramatic implosion of a large number of 
public companies including Enron, WorldCom, and others. Investigations of 
these companies revealed that there were widespread accounting problems, 
earnings manipulations, other kinds of corporate misconduct, abuses in ex-
ecutive compensation, and more. Indeed, only recently have we learned 
about the extent of option backdating that occurred during the 1990s.1  
The analyst scandals compounded the problem. It appeared that re-
search analysts fueled the flames of the technology bubble, the telecommu-
nications boom, the hot IPO market, and so forth, by releasing overly opti-
mistic and often baseless recommendations about scores of companies. Al-
though many investors had long been aware that analyst research was bi-
ased, the extent of the scandal was far greater as revealed on April 8, 2002, 
when New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer announced the results 
of his investigation.2 Spitzer revealed that research analysts had engaged in 
  
 * T.J. Maloney Professor of Business Law and Director, Corporate Law Center, Fordham Law 
School. Copyright 2006 Jill Fisch. This Essay is a modification of the Meador Lecture on Fiduciaries 
delivered at The University of Alabama School of Law on October 20, 2005. Portions of this Lecture 
have been developed more extensively in Jill E. Fisch, Does Analyst Independence Sell Investors Short?, 
55 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming 2007). 
 1. See, e.g., Damon Darlin & Eric Dash, 2 are Charged in Criminal Case on Stock Options, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 21, 2006, at A1 (describing government filing of criminal and civil charges against the 
former chief executive and former human resources executive of Brocade Communications Systems). 
 2. See Press Release, Office of N.Y. State Attorney General, Merrill Lynch Stock Rating System 
Found Biased by Undisclosed Conflicts of Interests (Apr. 8, 2002) [hereinafter Spitzer Press Release], 
available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/apr/apr08b_02.html. The results of the investigation 
were detailed in the Eric R. Dinallo affidavit. Petitioner’s Affidavit in Support of Application for an 
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a widespread practice of lies and misrepresentations in connection with their 
reports and recommendations to the investing public.3 According to the an-
nouncement, analysts had been claiming that their investment advice was 
objective when it was tainted by conflicts of interest. Analysts had publicly 
touted securities despite negative internal information. Analyst ratings and 
recommendations were overwhelmingly skewed in favor of urging investors 
to buy and were seldom if ever adjusted, even when stock prices plunged 
and issuers collapsed. 
A prominent figure in the analyst scandals was Salomon analyst Jack 
Grubman. Who was Jack Grubman? He was one of the best known and 
most influential analysts in the telecommunications industry. As such, his 
publicly announced opinions of telecommunications companies influenced 
market prices. When Jack Grubman told investors to buy AT&T, investors 
listened. The problem, according to the SEC, was that Jack Grubman did 
not recommend AT&T because he thought it was a good investment; he 
made the recommendation in order to get his children admitted to the pres-
tigious 92nd Street Y nursery school.4 
Then there was Henry Blodget. Henry Blodget specialized in Internet 
companies. During the 1990s, Internet companies were hot. Apparently, one 
could call virtually any company a “dot.com” and, simply by doing so, 
make it more attractive to investors. Similarly, investors appeared to view 
virtually any Internet based business strategy as credible.  
Blodget and his colleagues at Merrill Lynch publicly touted pets.com, 
infospace, etoys, mypoints.com, goto.com, and many other technology 
companies, urging investors to buy these supposedly wonderful stocks. At 
the same time, Blodget and his peers were privately describing the stocks as 
“dogs,” “powder keg[s],” and “piece[s] of junk.”5 
Regulators were concerned that investment banking and other conflicts 
of interest had led to the analyst scandals. In some cases, an issuer’s stock 
plunged all the way to zero while analysts maintained their “buy” recom-
mendations (although concededly at zero almost any company would be a 
good buy).6 Regulators were concerned that analyst research was not reli-
able and was misleading the market and investors. And so, they responded. 
The first out of the box was Eliot Spitzer. Spitzer’s investigation, which 
initially focused on Merrill Lynch, later extended to encompass the activi-
ties of the nation’s leading investment banks and revealed much of the mis-
conduct described above—the conflicts of interest, the fact that analysts 
  
Order Pursuant to General Business Law Section 354, at 10-13, Spitzer v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Index 
No. 02/401522 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 8, 2002) [hereinafter Dinallo Aff.], available at http://www.oag 
.state.ny.us/press/2002/apr/MerrillL.pdf. 
 3. Spitzer Press Release, supra note 2. 
 4. Complaint ¶¶ 89-99, SEC v. Grubman, 03-CV-2938 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2003), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/comp18111b.htm. 
 5. Dinallo Aff., supra note 2, at 10-12 (quoting Henry Blodget, Managing Director, Internet Re-
search Group, Merrill Lynch) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 6. Id. at 9-10. 
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were participating in investment banking, the concern that investment bank-
ing objectives were skewing the information that analysts were releasing to 
the market place, and so forth. Spitzer, with the involvement of the SEC, the 
self-regulatory organizations, and other regulators, negotiated the Global 
Research Settlement. The Settlement embodied a variety of regulatory re-
forms designed to address analyst conflicts of interest.7 
One of the highlights of the Global Research Settlement was the forced 
separation of investment banking operations from research. Analysts were 
not supposed to work for the investment banking people anymore. They 
were not supposed to help a firm in its investment banking business. They 
were not supposed to be compensated on the basis of how much they helped 
generate investment banking revenues. The separation of investment bank-
ing and research was designed to keep research pure and to free it from the 
taint of investment banking. 
Congress got involved as well. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 20028 ad-
dressed analyst conflicts of interest, although it did so in the same way that 
Congress often regulates in the securities industry—not by enacting sub-
stantive regulation but by instructing other regulators to take action. In sec-
tion 501 of Sarbanes-Oxley, Congress essentially told the SEC and the 
SROs, “Deal with conflicts of interest, we’ve got a problem here, adopt 
some rules, fix it.”9 The SEC adopted two rules that were designed to ad-
dress the reliability of analyst research: Regulation AC—Analyst Certifica-
tion10 and Regulation FD—Fair Disclosure.11 The New York Stock Ex-
change and the NASD adopted rules on analyst conflicts of interest.12 The 
core concept behind these regulations was that analyst conflicts of interest 
were to blame for the analyst scandals and that mandated independence was 
necessary to assure the reliability of analyst research and to restore the ana-
lyst’s position as gatekeeper or fiduciary for the investing public. It is that 
concept that I want to explore further here. 
II. RESEARCH ANALYSTS AND WHAT THEY DO 
Let me go into a little more detail about the role of the research analyst. 
The concern of the recent regulations, and the focus of this Lecture, is the 
  
 7. See SEC Fact Sheet on Global Analyst Research Settlements [hereinafter SEC Fact Sheet], 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/factsheet.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2007) (describing terms 
of Global Research Settlement). 
 8. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 501, 116 Stat. 745, 791-93 (to be codified 
in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 9. Id. (requiring SEC or SROs to promulgate rules addressing analyst conflicts of interest). 
 10. Regulation AC—Analyst Certification, 17 C.F.R. §§ 242.500-.505 (2006). 
 11. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 33-7881, Exchange Act 
Release No. 34-43154, Investment Company Act Release No. 24599, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716 (Aug. 24, 
2000). 
 12. See Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes by the NYSE and NASDAQ Relating to Research 
Analyst Conflicts of Interest, Exchange Act Release No. 34-48252, 68 Fed. Reg. 45,875 (Aug. 4, 2003); 
Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes by NASDAQ and NYSE Relating to Research Analyst Con-
flicts of Interest, Exchange Act Release No. 34-45908, 67 Fed. Reg. 34,968 (May 16, 2002). 
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sell-side analyst. Sell-side analysts work for big financial firms like Merrill 
Lynch and Goldman Sachs.13 These firms engage in a variety of types of 
securities business—investment banking, operating as a broker-dealer, and 
proprietary trading. Sell-side analysts are contrasted with buy-side analysts 
who work for institutional investors, such as mutual funds.14 There is also a 
third category of analysts, the so-called independent analysts. Independent 
analysts, at least in theory, just conduct research and sell it; they do not en-
gage in other types of securities business.15 Independent analysts are sup-
posed to be the “saviors” for providing reliable information to the securities 
markets.16 Although common wisdom places analysts in these three distinct 
categories, I am not convinced that the bright line categories really hold. In 
fact, I’m particularly wary of this line between sell-side analysts with big 
conflicts and independent analysts who are gate-keepers and whom we can 
trust because, as we’ll see in a moment, independent analysts have conflicts 
too. 
What do analysts do? They provide research coverage, they provide a 
report, and they provide a recommendation on the companies that they 
choose to cover.17 A substantial component of what the analyst does is 
cover a company. In many ways, it’s less what the analyst says than the fact 
that the analyst has chosen that particular company because there are thou-
sands of publicly traded companies out there, and we as investors are 
boundedly rational. Investors cannot pay attention to all of those companies. 
The mere fact that an analyst has chosen a particular company and written 
something about it makes it salient, makes it accessible. To a degree, analyst 
coverage causes people to invest almost regardless of the nature of the un-
derlying coverage.  
At the same time, however, analysts have good reasons to avoid provid-
ing negative coverage of an issuer, for reasons that I’ll discuss further. Thus, 
the decision to cover is a positive signal.18 In other words, analysts, by cov-
ering a company, essentially say to investors: “You should buy this stock.” 
Similarly, by terminating coverage, analysts send a subtle signal: “Sell this 
stock. This isn’t one you want to hold on to anymore.” This is a signal that 
institutional investors are particularly adept at reading.19 So coverage is a 
big deal. 
  
 13. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch & Hillary A. Sale, The Securities Analyst as Agent: Rethinking the Regu-
lation of Analysts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1035, 1041 (2003) (describing analyst categories). 
 14. Id. at n.18. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Ann Davis & Susanne Craig, Analyze This: Research Is Fuzzier Than Ever: ‘Independent’ Label 
Becomes a Mantra After the Crackdown, But Conflicts Have Emerged, WALL ST. J., Apr. 26, 2004, at 
C1. 
 17. See Fisch & Sale, supra note 13, at 1040-43 (describing nature of analyst investigation and 
resulting products). 
 18. See, e.g., Somnath Das et al., Analysts’ Selective Coverage and Subsequent Performance of 
Newly Public Firms, 61 J. FIN. 1159, 1160 (2006) (explaining that analysts engage in “selective cover-
age,” choosing to provide coverage for firms about which they have positive expectations). 
 19. See, e.g., Michael B. Mikhail et al., When Security Analysts Talk Who Listens? 3-4 (Apr. 6, 
2006) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=709801) (finding that institutions 
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Analysts also prepare a report. Analysts use their own research and pub-
licly available information both about a particular company and about the 
industry to explain what the company does and what its prospects are. Ana-
lysts make predictions about the company’s future, particularly about earn-
ings, and analysts issue a recommendation. Typically, firms use from three 
to five terms to characterize their recommendations, and the terms vary 
from firm to firm.20 UBS Warburg, for example, uses five categories, rang-
ing from strong buy to sell.21 Bear Stearns uses three: outperform, peer per-
form, and underperform.22 The extent to which firms explain these catego-
ries varies, and it is somewhat difficult to compare ratings from one com-
pany to those of another, but the recommendation serves the basic function 
of telling investors what it is that they are supposed to do. 
The information that analysts release is directed to their investor-clients 
and to the markets and the general public. In recent years, analysts have 
made particular efforts to reach out beyond their firm’s own clients and 
customers. Analysts go on TV, analysts issue statements that are reported in 
the press, analysts release recommendations to Thomson First Call. As a 
result, analysts don’t just speak to a select group of customers, they speak to 
the world. 
How is analyst research funded? The interesting thing about analyst re-
search is that it is remarkably difficult to fund.23 One might think that the 
analyst’s business model is relatively straightforward. The analyst does re-
search and determines which companies are good investments. The analyst 
then sells that information to investors. Investors purchase the research and 
receive the benefit of the analyst’s recommendations. But there is a problem 
with this business model. First, quality research is really expensive. So the 
analyst has to charge a lot of money for his or her product. Why is good 
research really expensive? There is an opportunity cost issue. If someone 
does a good job of identifying good investments, does it make more sense to 
sell that information or to simply purchase the stocks that have been identi-
fied? Hedge funds, for example, are competing with brokerage firms for the 
same information, and if they get it first, they will exploit the investment 
opportunity, limiting the analyst’s ability to profit from the research. 
  
and retail investors respond differently to analysts). 
 20. See MarketWatch, Guide to Analyst Recommendations, http://www.marketwatch.com/tools/ 
guide.asp?siteid=mktw (last visited Mar. 1, 2007) (identifying and describing recommendation terms 
used by various brokerage firms). A substantial number of firms revised their recommendations in 2002, 
moving from a five to a three point scale. See Ohad Kadan, Leonardo Madureira, Rong Wang & Tzachi 
Zach, Conflicts of Interest and Stock Recommendations—The Effects of the Global Settlement and 
Recent Regulations 13-14 (July 2005) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract 
=568884) (describing the change). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. See generally Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, How to Fix Wall Street: A Voucher Financing 
Proposal for Securities Intermediaries, 113 YALE L.J. 269, 286-90 (2003) (describing difficulty of 
financing quality research). 
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The second problem is a public good problem.24 As soon as the analyst 
releases his or her valuable research to an investor, the analyst’s ability to 
sell the information to someone else is reduced because the value of the 
information dissipates very quickly. There are a limited number of purchas-
ers before the information makes its way into the public domain, and its 
sales value disappears. 
As a result of these funding problems, traditionally research has been 
subsidized through business relationships. One type of relationship—the 
relationship that Eliot Spitzer and the SEC have been focusing on—is in-
vestment banking services. Issuers that are trying to sell their stock into the 
marketplace hire investment banks to help them. From the issuer’s perspec-
tive, it is attractive for the investment bank to have people on staff who pro-
vide information to the market about the issuer—and it is especially good if 
those people say favorable things about the issuer. Investment banking is 
one way that investment banks can subsidize analyst research because issu-
ers pay substantial sums for investment banking services. What is the ana-
lyst’s role? Analysts are marketing the issuer’s sale of stock. And some 
would say that they are doing marketing under the guise of providing inde-
pendent research. That is Eliot Spitzer’s concern. 
The analysts say, “Oh, Pets.com is a great company” because they are 
getting paid by Pets.com to sell Pets.com stock. You might say, “What’s 
wrong with that?” The used car salesman says, “It’s a great car, it’s not a 
lemon,” and we all know he doesn’t fool anyone because he’s being paid to 
sell this car. That is not a conflict of interest; that’s his job. Well that’s ex-
actly the question I want to explore a bit further: are analysts more appro-
priately viewed as salesmen or fiduciaries, because their resulting obliga-
tions are very different depending on the answer. 
Another way of funding analyst research is through brokerage commis-
sions. Prior to 1975, before commissions were deregulated, every broker 
had to charge the same amount for executing a trade.25 Brokers did not 
compete on execution quality, website quality, or things like that, and they 
didn’t compete on price because commission rates were fixed. Instead, they 
competed with research. Investors chose a broker because of the quality of 
information they received from that broker. At the same time, investors had 
no reason to place their trades through anyone else because no other broker 
could offer them a lower commission. If Merrill Lynch gave you good in-
formation, you traded through Merrill Lynch. The fixed commissions were 
artificially high—much higher than the brokers’ trading costs. And the dif-
ference paid for the brokerage firm’s research.  
Well the SEC did away with this form of subsidy when it eliminated 
fixed commissions.26 So now, if Merrill Lynch gives you great information 
  
 24. See id. at 285-86 (explaining the public good problem). 
 25. See id. at 286-87 (describing brokerage firm use of research to attract trading customers prior to 
elimination of fixed commissions). 
 26. Fixing of Rates of Commission, Exchange Act Release No. 34-11203, 40 Fed. Reg. 7,394 (Feb. 
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but you place your trade through Charles Schwab, you are very happy but 
you are not funding Merrill Lynch’s research anymore. Commissions still 
subsidize analysts’ research, but the commissions that subsidize analysts’ 
research are not retail investor commissions. They are commissions paid by 
institutional investors, commonly referred to as “soft dollars.”27 Soft dollars 
are commissions that exceed what the institutions would pay in a truly com-
petitive market for the cost of executing the trades.28 Institutions perhaps 
should pay three cents a share for a trade. Instead, they pay six cents a 
share, and the difference is for the bundle of services that the brokerage firm 
provides, which includes research.29 
Why do they bundle it this way? There are several reasons and, in fact, 
the payment of soft dollars has come under a fair amount of scrutiny.30 My 
personal view is that institutions use soft dollars to lower their reported ex-
penses. The cost of research purchased with soft dollars is reflected in 
commissions, and commissions are paid with fund assets. If, on the other 
hand, the investment adviser buys the research directly, it comes out of the 
investment adviser’s pocket. Either the investment adviser charges the fund 
for that research in the form of higher fund expenses—which are disclosed 
to potential investors—or the research costs lower the adviser’s profits.  
That’s one possible reason for using soft dollars; there are others, and 
the debate about soft dollars is too extensive to detail here. One important 
aspect of soft dollars, however, is the fact that soft dollars are used to subsi-
dize so-called independent research. In fact, industry representatives say 
that the funding for independent research would almost entirely disappear if 
soft dollars were eliminated.31 
Finally, analysts’ research is subsidized through trading. Trading can 
occur at the firm level in the form of proprietary trading, by the firm’s af-
filiated mutual funds—Sanford Bernstein’s well-known independent re-
search firm is owned by Alliance Capital, which manages a group of mutual 
funds, and by the analyst herself. Indeed, one of the other elements in the 
analyst scandals was the revelation that analysts were not just engaging in 
widespread personal trading but in trading that was contrary to their public 
  
20, 1975) (abolishing the ability of an exchange to require its members to charge a fixed rate for com-
mission as compensation for the use of the exchange’s facilities). 
 27. See Letter from Matthew P. Fink, President, Inv. Co. Inst., to William H. Donaldson, Chairman, 
SEC (Dec. 16, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/petn4-492.htm (explaining that soft 
dollars are the use of brokerage commissions to pay for research products and services). 
 28. See Jill E. Fisch, Does Analyst Independence Sell Investors Short?, 55 UCLA L. REV. (forth-
coming 2007) (explaining use of soft dollars). 
 29. See Charles Gasparino, Mutual-Fund Investors Risk Bite From ‘Soft-Dollar’ Deals, WALL ST. 
J., Sept. 16, 1998, at C1 (quoting financial adviser Robert Levitt as stating that money managers typi-
cally pay around six cents per share for soft dollar commissions and three cents per share for commis-
sions that do not include soft dollars). 
 30. See Fisch, supra note 28 (describing regulatory controversy over use of soft dollars). 
 31. See, e.g., Judith Burns, Independent Research Hits Snags: Business Isn’t Bustling As SEC May 
Move to Curb Soft-Dollar Arrangements, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 2004, at C15 (describing 2004 survey of 
independent research firms by Investorside Research Association reporting that “70% said they would 
consider quitting the business if the SEC bans soft-dollar transactions”). 
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recommendations.32 Analysts were saying, “Buy the stock,” but they were 
selling the stocks or selling stocks short. And the SEC didn’t think that was 
such a good idea.  
The point of detailing the different funding mechanisms for analyst re-
search is to demonstrate that neither retail brokerage customers nor the in-
vesting public really pay for the research. This is an important consideration 
in evaluating whether we should characterize research analysts as fiduciar-
ies with fiduciary responsibilities to retail investors. The investing public 
may see an analyst appear on Wall Street Week, but the public investor isn’t 
paying for that research beyond paying his or her cable bill.  
Similarly, retail brokerage customers, even though they might seem to 
be funding analyst research, really are not. Although it may appear that cus-
tomers who pay the commissions of the full-service broker such as Merrill 
Lynch are paying for research, the true answer is that the retail customer 
does not buy information with commission dollars. We see this, in part, in 
the way that brokerage firms treat their retail customers. The retail investor 
doesn’t receive the same report as the institutional investor, and the retail 
investor doesn’t receive information in a sufficiently timely fashion to trade 
profitably on the information. Retail investors may pay for a variety of ser-
vices—things like check writing, bill paying, consolidated accounts, ATM 
fee rebates—but the retail investor’s commission is not payment for quality 
information. This result is logical; after all, the retail investor could always 
obtain information from a full-service broker and trade elsewhere, at dis-
counted rates, limiting the broker’s ability to sell information profitably. 
Investors do purchase investment advice, but they do so through investment 
advisers and advised investing accounts, not through trading commissions. 
III. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND THE ANALYST AS FIDUCIARY  
The problem with the various funding sources that I’ve outlined 
above—the business relationships that subsidize analyst research—is that 
those relationships create incentives, incentives that are commonly de-
scribed as conflicts of interest. For example, the analyst who subsidizes 
research through investment banking business has an incentive to be opti-
mistic—to say that the company is great—in order to sell the issuer’s secu-
rities. Similarly, an analyst that recommends stock to institutional clients 
and hopes to obtain future trading commissions from those clients has an 
incentive to maintain his or her initial optimism on securities that have been 
the subject of a previous recommendation. If an institution buys a lot of 
stock in reliance on an analyst’s recommendation and the analyst then 
downgrades the stock, the institution will be left holding the bag when the 
stock price declines. An institution that has purchased on the basis of that 
  
 32. See, e.g., Jessica Sommar, Red-Faced SEC Targets Two-Faced Analysts, N.Y. POST, May 24, 
2002, at 41 (reporting that an SEC investigation found widespread personal trading by analysts contrary 
to their public recommendations). 
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analyst’s recommendations is going to be reluctant to rely on that analyst in 
the future. 
So these funding sources create incentives, and the result of these incen-
tives are proportionately too many buy recommendations, a reluctance of 
analysts to downgrade, and biases in terms of their coverage as well as bi-
ases in their decision to cover a company.33 This is not to say that analysts 
have an incentive to provide misinformation. The same business relation-
ships create incentives for analyst accuracy. Why? Because an analyst’s 
value to institutional clients, to issuer clients, and to a firm’s proprietary 
trading desk or mutual fund affiliate is based on his or her ability to move 
prices by influencing trading behavior.34 An analyst comes home from work 
and reports to her spouse: “Honey, I had a good day; I released a report and 
stock prices moved by 1%.” That’s an influential analyst. That is an analyst 
who is doing a good job. That is the analyst who is going to attract clients of 
these various types for his or her firm.  
Empirical evidence confirms both that analysts are overly optimistic 
and that they are accurate.35 Analyst sell recommendations at the height of 
the technology boom were virtually nonexistent—and keep in mind that this 
was when prices were at their peak.36 The theory is that investors should 
buy low and sell high, right? So prices were really high, and analysts were 
saying, with respect to virtually every company they covered, “Buy more, 
don’t sell.” Even after the regulatory crackdown, studies show that analyst 
optimism, although reduced, persists. At the same time, analysts are accu-
rate. A variety of academics have studied the performance of analyst rec-
ommendations and, although the results are mixed, most find that analyst 
picks outperform the market.37 Those results hold true not just for independ-
ent analysts but also for those with conflicts of interest. Indeed, the worst 
performance by conflicted analysts appears to be concentrated in the key 
bubble years—1996 through 1999.38  
Finally, investors rely on analysts’ information. Analysts’ recommenda-
tions and analysts’ reports do move stock prices. They move stock prices a 
  
 33. See Fisch, supra note 28 (describing incentives created by business relationships and their effect 
on information provided by analysts). 
 34. See, e.g., Tomi Kilgore, SpectraLink Shares Jump on Analyst Upgrade, MARKETWATCH, Aug. 
16, 2006, http://www.marketwatch.com (keyword search “Kilgore and SpectraLink”) (describing 12% 
increase in price of SpectraLink shares following analyst upgrade). 
 35. See Jill E. Fisch, Regulatory Responses to Investor Irrationality: The Case of the Research 
Analyst, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 57, 64-65 (2006) (describing empirical studies of analyst recom-
mendations). 
 36. See Lynn E. Turner, Chief Accountant, SEC, Speech by SEC Staff: The State of Financial 
Reporting Today: An Unfinished Chapter III, Speech at the Third Annual SEC Disclosure & Accounting 
Conference (June 21, 2001) (transcript available at http://sec.gov/news/speech/spch508.htm) (reporting 
that only 0.8% of 26,000 analyst recommendations surveyed as of March 1, 2000, were sell or strong 
sell). 
 37. See Fisch, supra note 35, at 65-66 (summarizing studies). 
 38. See Brad M. Barber et al., Comparing the Stock Recommendation Performance of Investment 
Banks and Independent Research Firms 3-4 (Sept. 2005) (unpublished manuscript, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=572301). 
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lot. Sophisticated institutional investors, who should be able to identify reli-
able information sources, seek out and rely on sell-side research. Interest-
ingly, despite having the opportunity to hire and produce research in house, 
institutions continue to rely on sell-side analysts, indicating that sell-side 
research does provide value.  
Having observed that analyst research is valuable but biased, regulators 
have focused primarily on reducing or eliminating the potential for bias by 
mandating independence.39 The theory is that if analysts are prohibited from 
maintaining the other business relationships that I have identified—and the 
primary regulatory focus has been investment banking relationships—they 
will lack the incentive to distort their recommendations to favor those busi-
ness interests, resulting in the provision of more accurate information to 
investors and the marketplace. Investment banking conflicts have received 
the majority of the attention in the analyst scandals, which explains why the 
reform effort has focused on investment banking. The SEC’s theory is that 
mandatory independence will restore the analyst’s role as a gatekeeper.40 
One question is, why independence? Even if separating investment 
banking from research would improve the quality of research or the accu-
racy of analyst recommendations, why should regulators impose this re-
quirement as opposed to allowing the market to evaluate the quality of the 
information provided by analysts and respond accordingly? After all, con-
flicting business relationships are commonplace, and regulators do not typi-
cally interfere with the divided loyalties inspired by those relationships. 
Producers may sell the same product to two competing firms and, indeed, 
on terms that favor one firm over another. Although used car salesmen are 
not allowed to lie, no one expects them to offer an objective and reliable 
opinion on a car to a prospective buyer.41  
Now, of course, Congress and the SEC have recently imposed height-
ened independence requirements on public auditors.42 One may ask: how 
are analysts different from auditors? The answer is that auditors have a very 
special role—a role mandated by the federal securities laws and the public 
offering process. By statute, publicly traded companies are required to have 
audited financial statements. Thus, statutory law creates an explicit role for 
auditors as gatekeepers for the capital markets. Although auditors are not 
government employees, they are something close. As a result, auditors’ ob-
  
 39. Some additional regulatory restrictions include increased disclosure requirements, limitations on 
personal trading by analysts, and bans on particular practices that were viewed as highly problematic, 
such as booster shots. 
 40. The Impact of the Global Settlement: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 69 (2003) (testimony of William H. Donaldson, Chairman, SEC). 
 41. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 239-40 (1980) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“As 
a general rule, neither party to an arm's-length business transaction has an obligation to disclose informa-
tion to the other unless the parties stand in some confidential or fiduciary relation.”). 
 42. See Press Release, SEC, Commission Adopts Rules Strengthening Auditor Independence (Jan. 
22, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-9.htm (describing auditor independence 
requirements contained in Title II of Sarbanes-Oxley and SEC rule-making implementing those require-
ments). 
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ligations—in contrast to those of analysts—are not defined simply by pri-
vate contract.  
In my opinion, the independence requirement is premised upon the con-
ception of analysts as fiduciaries. I believe that regulators have imposed an 
independence requirement because they view analysts as fiduciaries to the 
marketplace or investors.43 Fiduciary obligations, after all, are the way we 
impose an independence requirement in the private law context. Fiduciary 
obligations are what separate certain relationships—principal/agent, law-
yer/client, trustee/beneficiary—from the standard arms-length contract, in 
which each party is entitled to act out of self-interest.44 Only fiduciaries 
have an obligation of unselfishness, an obligation which turns self-interest 
into a conflict of interest.45 The loyalty and integrity required of a fiduciary 
have been characterized by Judge Cardozo as “the punctilio of an honor the 
most sensitive.”46 
Does this fiduciary conception make sense? It is widely recognized that 
the financial firms that employ sell-side analysts sell a range of products 
and services. They provide investment banking services to issuers. They sell 
fairness opinions in connection with a variety of transactions such as merg-
ers. They provide brokerage services to investors that include purchasing 
and selling securities on behalf of those investors. In many cases, firms pro-
vide investment management services for mutual funds. And they provide 
investment research. The interests of customers of each of these goods and 
services vary and, in many cases, are in direct opposition. The interest of an 
issuer, for example, is to sell its securities at the highest possible price; 
while the interests of an institutional investor brokerage client is to purchase 
securities at a low price, maximizing the potential future investment gain. 
Even within a single category, the interests of customers may conflict. A 
current shareholder in a covered company may prefer favorable research 
that maintains the existing stock price; a prospective investor will want a 
less optimistic report that dissuades him from making a risky investment.47 
  
 43. See SEC, Statement Regarding Global Settlement Related to Analyst Conflicts of Interest, Apr. 
28, 2003, http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch042803com.htm (describing limitations on investing 
banking contacts as “designed to maintain the analyst’s role as gatekeeper in the offering process but to 
prevent the analyst from serving as marketer or cheerleader for investment banking transactions”); see 
also John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Re-
forms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 302 (2004) (describing as gatekeepers, who “protect the interests of dis-
persed investors . . . securities analysts, who verify or assess corporate disclosures in order to advise 
investors”); David Millon, Who“Caused” the Enron Debacle?, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 309, 311 
(2003) (describing Enron’s analysts as gatekeepers who failed “to perform their watchdog responsibili-
ties”). 
 44. The Second Circuit stated that “hornbook fiduciary relations are those existing between attorney 
and client, executor and heir, guardian and ward, principal and agent, trustee and trust beneficiary, and 
senior corporate official and shareholder.” United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 568 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 45. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 13 cmt. a (1958) (defining a fiduciary as “a person 
having a duty, created by his undertaking, to act primarily for the benefit of another in matters connected 
with his undertaking”). 
 46. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928). 
 47. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Temporal Perspectives: Resolving the Conflict Between Current 
and Future Investors, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1044 (2005) (describing differing interests of current and future 
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 In addition, analyst research is funded primarily by a firm’s issuer and 
institutional clients, who pay for that research both directly and through 
brokerage commissions, underwriting fees, and soft dollars. The general 
public simply is not the analyst’s client.48 If analysts are forced by fiduciary 
principles to choose between their paying clients and the general public, 
they will simply abandon the retail investor.49 
Whether brokers owe fiduciary duties to their customer clients is not a 
new question. In the context of financial professionals, the law has tradi-
tionally drawn a line between investment advisers and broker-dealers, im-
posing broad fiduciary obligations only upon the former. Congress adopted 
the Investment Advisers Act to assure that investment advisers—those who 
provide personalized investment advice—provide unbiased advice.50 Quot-
ing the legislative history of the Act, the Supreme Court specifically found 
that Congress intended investment advisers to be treated as fiduciaries.51 As 
a result, the Act reflects “a congressional intent to eliminate, or at least to 
expose, all conflicts of interest which might incline an investment adviser—
consciously or unconsciously—to render advice which was not disinter-
ested.”52  
Congress explicitly exempted broker-dealers from the Investment Ad-
visers Act.53 Significantly, Congress made this decision despite the fact that 
brokers, at the time the statute was passed, were known to provide research 
to their customers, so-called “brokerage house advice.”54 Additionally, Con-
gress was aware that brokers might provide this advice despite having other 
business interests that might cause their advice to be biased.55 
 Courts have agreed with this approach, holding that, as a general mat-
ter, brokers do not owe broad fiduciary obligations to their customers.56 As 
  
shareholders). 
 48. See, e.g., FIN. SERVS. AUTH., CONFLICTS OF INTEREST: INVESTMENT RESEARCH AND ISSUES OF 
SECURITIES 15 (2003), http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/cp/cp171.pdf (“Investment banks that produce in-
vestment research do so mainly for the benefit of their investment clients . . . .”). 
 49. In other work, I document how analysts have done exactly that, reducing the quality and quan-
tity of research that is available to the retail investor. See Fisch, supra note 28.  
 50. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to -21 (2000). 
 51. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 188 (1963). 
 52. Id. at 191-92. 
 53. Section 202(a)(11)(C) of the Advisers Act exempts from the definition of an investment adviser 
a broker or dealer “whose performance of [advisory] services is solely incidental to the conduct of his 
business as a broker or dealer and who receives no special compensation therefor.” 
 54. Certain Broker-Dealers Deemed Not To Be Investment Advisers, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
51523, Investment Company Act Release No. 2376, 70 Fed. Reg. 20,424, 20,428 (Apr. 19, 2005) [here-
inafter Final Merrill Release], available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/34-51523.pdf.  
 55. Id. at 20,433 n.93 (“Despite such conflicts, Congress nonetheless determined to except brokers 
providing such advice from the scope of the Advisers Act.”). 
 56. See, e.g., Associated Randall Bank v. Griffin, Kubik, Stephens & Thompson, Inc., 3 F.3d 208 
(7th Cir. 1994) (describing limited fiduciary obligations of brokers under both federal and state law); 
Hotmar v. Lowell H. Listrom & Co., 808 F.2d 1384 (10th Cir. 1987) (rejecting argument that broker 
acquired a fiduciary duty by giving advice to customer with respect to non-discretionary account); 
Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Boeck, 377 N.W.2d 605, 609 (Wis. 1985) (rejecting claim 
that broker had fiduciary obligation to correct investment advice unless client maintained a discretionary 
account). 
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the Second Circuit has explained, there “is no general fiduciary duty inher-
ent in an ordinary broker/customer relationship.”57 Although special cir-
cumstances such as investor allocation of discretionary authority to the bro-
ker may lead to the imposition of fiduciary principles, these cases may be 
understood within the framework of traditional agency law.58 
In contrast, other securities professionals—brokers in particular—are 
not covered by the Investment Advisers Act and do not owe broad fiduciary 
obligations to their clients. The SEC reiterated this distinction in the context 
of adopting the Merrill Lynch Rule, which broadened the statutory exemp-
tion in the Investment Advisers Act that permits brokers to provide inciden-
tal investment advice.59 Interestingly the SEC acknowledged that broker 
advice to customers was subject to potential conflicts of interest, but ex-
pressly condoned that conflict, requiring only that the potential conflicts be 
disclosed to customers.60 
Although the DC Circuit recently invalidated the Merrill Lynch Rule as 
beyond the SEC’s statutory authority,61 the adoption of the Rule can be un-
derstood in the context of Easterbrook and Fischel’s rationale for fiduciary 
duties. Easterbrook and Fischel, writing in 1993 before the analyst scandals, 
proposed a contractual model of fiduciary duties, rather than a paternalistic 
one.62 Easterbrook and Fischel explained that fiduciary duties are an effi-
cient method of contractual gap-filling when it is too difficult to specify the 
parties’ obligations explicitly. A fiduciary relation, they argue, “is a contrac-
tual one characterized by unusually high costs of specification and monitor-
ing.”63 In determining whether to apply fiduciary principles, then, the 
court’s task is to determine what obligations the parties would have agreed 
to if bargaining were sufficiently cheap. The court’s obligation is to impose 
the terms of this hypothetical bargain. 
The value of the Easterbrook and Fischel approach is twofold. First, it 
rejects the paternalistic application of fiduciary principles to situations in 
which the parties had the option of contractually specifying obligations that 
they chose to forgo. An investor can, for example, seek disclosure of analyst 
  
 57. Indep. Order of Foresters v. Donald, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 157 F.3d 933, 940 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 58. See, e.g., SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 813 (2002) (recognizing fiduciary relationship in 
which elderly man and his mentally retarded daughter gave broker “discretion to manage the account and 
a general power of attorney to engage in securities transactions without their prior approval”). 
 59. See Final Merrill Release, supra note 54.   
 60. See 17 C.F.R. § 275.202(a)(11)-1(a)(1)(ii) (2007) (requiring advertisements, contracts, and other 
documentation relating to such accounts to “include a prominent statement that: ‘Your account is a 
brokerage account and not an advisory account. Our interests may not always be the same as yours. 
Please ask us questions to make sure you understand your rights and our obligations to you, including 
the extent of our obligations to disclose conflicts of interest and to act in your best interest. We are paid 
both by you and, sometimes, by people who compensate us based on what you buy. Therefore, our 
profits, and our salespersons’ compensation, may vary by product and over time.’’’ ).  
 61. See Fin. Planning Ass’n v. SEC, No. 04-1242, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 7356, at *19 (D.C. Cir. 
Mar. 30, 2007) (holding that the rule “is in direct conflict with both the statutory text and the Committee 
Reports”). 
 62. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON. 425 
(1993). 
 63. Id. at 427. 
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conflicts of interest and refuse to trade on the basis of recommendations 
released by conflicted analysts or those who fail to provide such disclosure. 
Second, the Easterbrook and Fischel approach recognized that after-the-fact 
imposition of fiduciary obligations imposes a cost on subsequent relation-
ships. Using the specific example of broker recommendations, Easterbrook 
and Fischel observed that treating brokers as fiduciaries would likely cause 
the market to adjust in ways that would not increase investor protection but 
simply increase cost of and access to information.64 Similarly, the SEC rec-
ognized that the Merrill Lynch Rule encourages innovation in the provision 
of services to investors by freeing brokers from the risk that they will be 
treated as fiduciaries in connection with the provision of those services. 
Applying this analysis suggests several reasons why the imposition of 
fiduciary obligations on analysts is undesirable. First, issuers and institu-
tional investors—arguably the analysts’ true clients because they pay for 
analyst research, directly or indirectly—are sophisticated customers that can 
address concerns about analyst independence explicitly by contract. To the 
extent that analyst research is more credible in the absence of conflicts of 
interest, analysts should be able to charge a premium for that research if 
they contractually commit to avoid investment banking or other conflicts. 
Similarly, if institutions are concerned about analyst conflicts of interest, 
they can bargain for independence, limiting their consumption of research to 
analysts that maintain freedom from investment banking or other relation-
ships. To the extent, however, that other business relationships create syner-
gies or lower the costs of production, customers may be willing to accept 
those relationships. In either case, the market is an appropriate tool for as-
certaining the extent to which independence is valuable.  
The traditional justifications for the imposition of fiduciary duties are 
simply inapplicable. Institutional investors do not require the paternalism 
associated with fiduciary duties. Contracting for analyst independence is not 
complex or expensive. And analysts do not exercise discretionary authority 
over the property of their institutional and issuer clients. Now this analysis 
only goes so far, of course, because arguably the intended beneficiaries of 
analyst regulation are not the institutions but the retail investors. Even if 
small investors do not really pay for analyst research, one can argue that 
they are misled by it. The markets may be efficient overall because sophisti-
cated investors are “in on the game,” but small investors are losing money. 
Of course this is true, and my answer to this concern is twofold. First, 
where a retail investor and an investment professional truly have a personal 
relationship such that the investor reasonably relies on the professional’s 
investment advice, that relationship is, and should be, characterized as an 
investment advisory relationship. Such relationships are subject to the In-
vestment Advisers Act, which includes the imposition of fiduciary obliga-
tions. It is important, however, to distinguish between personalized invest-
  
 64. Id. at 428. 
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ment advice and the generic provision of issuer and market information, at 
no cost, to the marketplace as a whole. Although I do not argue that the pro-
vision of such information should be immune from regulatory oversight—
and indeed, it remains subject to the antifraud provisions of the federal secu-
rities laws—I do not believe it should create fiduciary obligations. 
Second, regulators are limited in their ability to protect small investors 
from unreliable or unsuitable information. Concededly, investors rely on a 
wide variety of information from dubious sources—sources far more dubi-
ous than conflicted research analysts. I have described elsewhere SEC regu-
latory actions based on allegations that individuals were able to manipulate 
the market and inflate stock prices by hyping stocks through Internet chat 
rooms and phony answering machine messages.65 To the extent that the 
SEC has correctly found that the market responds to these schemes, it ap-
pears that non-trivial numbers of investors are willing to trade on informa-
tion virtually regardless of its source. At the same time, it is doubtful that 
the SEC has the ability to distinguish reliably between suitable and unsuit-
able information for investors, particularly in light of the variety of well-
documented market irrationalities and biases that might cause seemingly 
irrelevant information, such as hemlines, to be a reasonable basis for in-
vestment decisions.  
IV. THE COSTS OF ANALYST INDEPENDENCE 
I indicated earlier that one of the arguments against the imposition of fi-
duciary obligations is the ensuing cost. Let me talk a little further about the 
costs of mandated analyst independence. First, let’s take a look at the so-
called independent analysts. Independent analysts are, in the view of regula-
tors, the appropriate model for the provision of research to the marketplace. 
Indeed, the Global Research Settlement requires the defendant investment 
banks to provide $432.5 million for independent research reports, which are 
being distributed to their customers.66  
But the independent analysts are not as independent as one might think. 
I explore this issue in more detail elsewhere, but consider the example of 
Morningstar, the poster child of independent analysis. Morningstar started 
off by rating mutual funds—you may be familiar with the Morningstar Five 
Star rating, which, incidentally, has a major effect on the movement of 
funds into and out of mutual funds.67 Morningstar now does a whole lot 
more. Morningstar has expanded its equity research substantially—it has 
become one of the largest independent research providers, and it is selling 
  
 65. Fisch, supra note 35, at 70-73. For a recording of a phony answering machine message fraud 
scheme, see SEC, “Wrong Numbers” and Stock Tips on Your Answering Machine, http://www.sec.gov 
/investor/pubs/wrongnumberscam.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2007). 
 66. SEC Fact Sheet, supra note 7. 
 67. Nicholas Stein, Morningstar’s Bright Future Turns Cloudy, FORTUNE, Jan. 10, 2005, at 94, 94-
95. 
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its research to five of the defendant investment banks in connection with the 
terms of the Global Research Settlement.68 
But Morningstar may suffer from conflicts of interest as well. Among 
its other businesses, Morningstar sells its data and research to big institu-
tions, including mutual funds. So Morningstar relies increasingly on income 
from customers, those same customers that it purports to rate independ-
ently.69 Morningstar also purchased investment advisory firm Ibbotson As-
sociates, expanding its provision of consulting and advisory services and 
increasing concerns that the company was “get[ting] paid from both sides of 
the table.”70 In the last few years, Morningstar has been the subject of inves-
tigations by the SEC, the Labor Department, and N.Y. State Attorney Gen-
eral Eliot Spitzer, although the SEC subsequently announced that it had 
closed its investigation.71 The investigations by the Labor Department and 
Spitzer reportedly focus on possible conflicts of interest.72 
Similarly, although research firm Sanford Bernstein frequently appears 
at the top of lists of so-called independent analysts, it is owned by mutual 
fund Alliance Capital. As the Wall Street Journal has observed, this rela-
tionship creates a risk that the firm’s research could be influenced by the 
interests of its mutual fund parent.73 “[T]he firm’s big holdings could rise or 
fall on the analysts’ upgrades or downgrades.”74 The risk was sufficient to 
prevent Sanford Bernstein from qualifying as a provider of independent 
research for purposes of the Global Research Settlement.75 The SEC has 
also fined Sanford Bernstein and one of its analysts, Brad Hintz, for violat-
ing conflict of interest rules.76  
Why do conflicts persist even at supposedly independent research 
firms? Because investment banking conflicts are not the only business rela-
tionships that create a risk of influence. At the same time, the structure of 
the research market doesn’t support an adequate supply of research absent 
subsidization through other business operations. If firms are unable to sub-
sidize research, they will cut back, and studies indicate that they have done 
so. The quantity of research available to the marketplace—and to the small 
  
 68. Id. at 98. 
 69. Id. at 95, 98. 
 70. Arden Dale, Morningstar Bolsters Advice Lineup: Ibbotson Deal Adds Heft In Investment Strat-
egy; Magellan’s Turnaround, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 2006, at C11 (quoting Mercer Bullard, Univ. of Miss. 
law professor) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 71. John Spence, SEC Passes on Morningstar Action: Notice in 2004 Warned Of Potential Civil 
Charges Over Reporting of Bad Data, WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 2006, at C15.  
 72. Id.; Kathleen O’Donnell, Morningstar to Buy 401(k) Manager: Deal for Ibbotson Associates 
Adds $3.5 Billion in Assets But Raises Conflict Concerns, WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 2005, at C17 (describ-
ing the investigations). 
 73. Susanne Craig & Ann Davis, Analyze This: Research Is Fuzzier Than Ever: A Year After Firms’ 
Settlement, NASD Is Launching Inquiry Into How Ratings Are Applied, WALL ST. J., Apr. 26, 2004, at 
C1. 
 74. Davis & Craig, supra note 16. 
 75. See Randall Smith & Ann Davis, Dark Horse Leads Stock-Research Sweepstakes, WALL ST. J., 
Dec. 16, 2003, at C1. 
 76. Susanne Craig, Brokerage House, Analyst Are Fined In Conflict Case, WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 
2006, at C5. 
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investor in particular—has dropped dramatically since these regulatory re-
forms.77 I go into the statistics in more detail elsewhere, but firms have sub-
stantially reduced their expenditures on sell-side research.78 Moreover, fu-
ture developments such as the end of the temporary subsidy provided by the 
Global Research Settlement and the possible elimination of soft dollar pay-
ments for research, payments that currently account for approximately 90% 
of the revenue of independent research firms, are likely to reduce the 
amount of research further.79 
The biggest effect is on the research coverage of small issuers: the small 
companies, the small caps, and the start-up companies that are just looking 
for public investors—a huge number of them have no coverage at all. Not a 
single analyst is willing to talk about their stock. And if analysts do not pro-
vide coverage, the market with respect to that issuer’s securities will not be 
very efficient, and people will not invest in the company.80  
An interesting market development that we have seen in response to this 
problem is paid research or research for hire.81 A number of research firms 
advertise their services to small issuers along the following lines: “You’re a 
small company; no analyst will pay attention to you. Pay us $25,000, and 
we’ll write a report; send that report out to institutional investors; put it on 
our website; and then people will know about you.” Well, talk about a con-
flict of interest! The issuer is paying the analyst to write a report. Will the 
analyst write a good report or a bad report? How much future business can 
the analyst expect from that issuer, or any other issuer, if he or she writes a 
bad report?  
In fact, issuer-financed research is a great idea. In an article that I wrote 
with Stephen Choi, we proposed a voucher-financing system for analysts’ 
research where issuers would pay for the research.82 The key to our pro-
posal, however, was that we took the job of selecting the analyst’s firm 
away from the issuer’s management because the whole point of information 
in the marketplace is to evaluate and potentially discipline management. 
Consequently, management cannot operate as the gatekeepers and select the 
source of this research. Along these lines, there have been some preliminary 
efforts to remove the taint associated with paid research by providing a neu-
tral mechanism for selecting the research provider.83 
  
 77. Indeed, the effect has increased the gap between the information available to market profession-
als and to retail investors. See Ann Davis, Increasingly, Stock Research Serves the Pros, Not ‘Little 
Guy,’ WALL ST. J., Mar. 5, 2004, at A1. 
 78. Fisch, supra note 28. 
 79. Id.  
 80. See Choi & Fisch, supra note 23, at 290-91 (describing social value of equity research). 
 81. See Susanne Craig, Firm to Research Stock ‘Orphans,’ WALL ST. J., June 7, 2005, at C3; see 
also Fisch, supra note 28, 43-44 (describing research for hire). 
 82. Choi & Fisch, supra note 23, at 314-28. 
 83. See Craig, supra note 81 (describing a proposal by Nasdaq and Reuters to form the Independent 
Research Network that would screen independent research firms and provide coverage for “orphan” 
issuers). 
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V. ALTERNATE REFORM STRATEGIES 
If mandatory independence is not the answer, what is? Very briefly—
and I consider more detailed alternative regulatory proposals in other 
work84—my suggestions here start from the premise that, for the reasons 
described above, our traditional approach to broker regulation has been 
through narrowly tailored rules that address specific risks of abuse. Thus, if 
we are concerned that brokers are not taking sufficient care with respect to 
the protection of customer assets, we impose rules regarding recordkeeping 
and segregation of funds. If we are worried about brokers charging exces-
sive fees, we require confirmations that break down broker charges indi-
vidually. Note the difference between these types of rules and the imposi-
tion of broad-based fiduciary principles, which are costlier precisely be-
cause they are standard-based and create uncertain liability exposure. 
Applying this approach to the analyst scandal suggests several possibili-
ties. First, if we are concerned with personal trading by analysts and their 
firms, particularly the trading-based market effect of the release of the ana-
lyst’s recommendation, we could restrict this type of trading or require in-
creased disclosure of short-swing trading profits. Many of you are familiar 
with section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which addresses 
short-swing trading by corporate insiders.85 Officers, directors, and 10% 
stockholders must disclose their personal trading, and if they buy and sell 
within a six month period, they have to turn their short-swing trading profits 
over to the issuer. One of the effects of section 16 is that it prevents corpo-
rate insiders from taking advantage of information disparities by trading 
right before a favorable press release or other good news. Regulators could 
impose the same type of restriction on analysts and their firms. This restric-
tion would not prevent analysts from subsidizing research through personal 
and proprietary trading but would prevent them from trading on the market 
impact of their public statements as opposed to the long-term prospects of 
the company. 
One could respond to this suggestion by pointing to the fact that the 
regulatory reforms adopted in response to the analyst scandals already re-
quire disclosure of personal and proprietary trading. This is true. But the 
disclosure requirements do not extend to all analysts, and even when they 
do, they require very limited disclosure.86 Independent analysts who are not 
members of the New York Stock Exchange or NASD are not even subject 
to a disclosure requirement and are free to engage in whatever proprietary 
trading they want.  
Standardizing analyst ratings and recommendations would also be valu-
able. Firms use different names and different numbers of ratings, limiting 
investors’ ability to compare them. In addition, regulators could respond to 
  
 84. See Choi & Fisch, supra note 23; Fisch, supra note 28. 
 85. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 78p (2000). 
 86. Disclosure of firm and analyst trading positions has improved since this Lecture was delivered. 
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overly optimistic recommendations by requiring firms to distribute their 
recommendations uniformly across the full spectrum of ratings.87 If a firm 
used three ratings such as buy, sell, and hold, it would be required to include 
an equal number of covered issuers in each of the three categories. This 
solution would immediately address the problem of 95% of recommenda-
tions being buy recommendations. The resulting buy recommendations 
would, in turn, be more informative. The system would reduce issuer re-
taliation against analysts for negative recommendations because the per-
centage of negative recommendations would be so much higher. This re-
form would also reduce the incentive for analysts to terminate coverage 
because they would need to cover some “bad” companies in order to main-
tain the required distribution, a development that would result in a lot of 
new information for the market. 
It should also be easier to determine whether analysts are doing a good 
job. A third possible reform would be required public disclosure of analyst 
ratings.88 Several private firms are now rating analysts on the basis of their 
performance.89 Retail investors can obtain some of this information—some 
for free and some for a small fee.90 But the retail investor can not obtain all 
of the information—much more is provided to institutional investors.91 Ad-
ditionally, the ratings information is not provided together with the analyst’s 
public statements. It would not be very difficult to move from these types of 
ratings to a number that must be affixed to any public dissemination by the 
analyst of a recommendation or report. So if an investor is reviewing an 
analyst’s report on IBM, the investor can see that this particular analyst is 
rated 9 on a scale of 1 to 10. And there would be a place where the investor 
could learn what a 9 rating means.  
Similarly, a lot of analyst information is bundled before it is released to 
the public. Thomson Financial provides widely followed consensus esti-
mates, reflecting information to which investors may not have direct ac-
cess.92 But while Thomson Financial reports that the consensus analyst rec-
ommendation is “buy,” the investor does not know which analysts’ recom-
mendations are reflected in that consensus, what their conflicts are, or what 
  
 87. Studies show that the distribution of recommendations has improved, but it is by no means 
uniform. See Fisch, supra note 28 (describing shifts in composition of ratings and recommendations). 
 88. In other work, I develop a more extensive proposal for disclosure of analyst performance. See 
Fisch, supra note 28. 
 89. See, e.g., Investars 2005, http://www.investars.com (last visited Mar. 3, 2007); StarMine, 
http://www.starmine.com (last visited Mar. 3, 2007). 
 90. But see StarMine, http://www.starmine.com/index.phtml?page_set=investor (explaining that 
StarMine’s analyst rating service for individual investors has been discontinued because “we are cur-
rently focusing our resources on our institutional-grade StarMine Professional research service”). 
 91. See, e.g., Alistair Barr, Rating the Independent Researchers; Despite Restrictions, Some Re-
searchers Are Tracked, CBS MARKETWATCH, Aug. 6, 2004, http://www.investars.com/articles/article 
08062004-2.asp (stating that some research firms will not provide access to rating services that provide 
information to retail investors). 
 92. T. Clifton Green, The Value of Client Access to Analyst Recommendations, 41 J. FIN. & QUANT. 
ANAL. 1, 4 (2006) (explaining the production of Thomson Financial’s First Call consensus estimates).  
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their performance track record is. Even a consolidated or average perform-
ance rating would add a great deal of informativeness.  
A final possibility is increased analyst accountability for outright fraud. 
At the beginning of this Lecture, I talked about the analyst scandals. The 
scandals did not go unnoticed by plaintiffs’ lawyers. There has been exten-
sive litigation and arbitration against analysts and their firms. Most of the 
efforts to recover against analysts, even for knowing false statements, how-
ever, have been unsuccessful due to various legal obstacles such as statute 
of limitations, loss causation, and limitations on fraud on the market.93 It is 
somewhat ironic that, at the same time that regulators are condemning busi-
ness relationships that present even the potential for bias, courts are limiting 
analyst exposure, not for breach of fiduciary duty, but for fraud. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Analysts play a key role in transmitting information to the marketplace. 
The analyst scandals have caused regulators to seek to increase the reliabil-
ity of analyst information by mandating independence. I have argued that, in 
essence, mandated independence casts the analyst in the role of fiduciary. 
Fiduciary obligations, however, are inconsistent with the business model 
upon which analyst research is based and by which it is financed. As a re-
sult, mandatory independence threatens the financial viability of sell-side 
research and risks the counterproductive consequence of reduced market 
efficiency. 
Instead, I argue that it would be more appropriate to address analyst 
misconduct through narrowly tailored regulations similar to those that regu-
lators have enacted in the past. As the market responds to the effect of the 
new analyst rules, regulators may be called upon to reexamine the conse-
quences of the fiduciary model.  
  
 93. See, e.g., Hevesi v. Citigroup Inc., 366 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 2004); Demarco v. Lehman Bros., Inc., 
222 F.R.D. 243 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); In re Merrill Lynch & Co. Research Reports Sec. Litig., 273 F. Supp. 
2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).  
